How Housing Slumps End.

We construct a simple probit model of the determinants of real house price slump endings. We find that the probability of a house price slump ending is higher, the smaller was the pre-slump house price run-up; the greater has been the cumualtive house price decline; the lower are real mortgage inte...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bénétrix, A, Eichengreen, B, O'Rourke, K
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: Department of Economics (University of Oxford) 2011
_version_ 1826276963204988928
author Bénétrix, A
Eichengreen, B
O'Rourke, K
author_facet Bénétrix, A
Eichengreen, B
O'Rourke, K
author_sort Bénétrix, A
collection OXFORD
description We construct a simple probit model of the determinants of real house price slump endings. We find that the probability of a house price slump ending is higher, the smaller was the pre-slump house price run-up; the greater has been the cumualtive house price decline; the lower are real mortgage interest rates; and the higher is GDP growth. Slumps are longer, other things being equal, where housing supply is more elastic, but shorter the more developed are financial institutions. For slumps of a given size, shorter sharper slumps are associated with worse macroeconomic performance in the short run, but with better performance in the long run. This suggests that for sufficiently low discount rates, policy makers should not impede the decline in real house prices, and this conclusion is reinforced by the finding that after a certain duration, house price slumps can become self-reinforcing. On the other hand, we also find evidence that during downturns, falling house prices can lead to lower private sector credit flows. Policy makers thus face a delicate balancing act. While they should not intervene to artifically prop up overvalued house prices, they should ensure that their macroeconomic and banking policies are such as to make a bottoming-out more likely. This suggests that they should keep real interest rates low, and ensure that banks are well-capitalised.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T23:21:44Z
format Working paper
id oxford-uuid:68f47879-cd89-45ed-a61b-6c50b6ed6a88
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-06T23:21:44Z
publishDate 2011
publisher Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:68f47879-cd89-45ed-a61b-6c50b6ed6a882022-03-26T18:48:21ZHow Housing Slumps End.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:68f47879-cd89-45ed-a61b-6c50b6ed6a88EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2011Bénétrix, AEichengreen, BO'Rourke, KWe construct a simple probit model of the determinants of real house price slump endings. We find that the probability of a house price slump ending is higher, the smaller was the pre-slump house price run-up; the greater has been the cumualtive house price decline; the lower are real mortgage interest rates; and the higher is GDP growth. Slumps are longer, other things being equal, where housing supply is more elastic, but shorter the more developed are financial institutions. For slumps of a given size, shorter sharper slumps are associated with worse macroeconomic performance in the short run, but with better performance in the long run. This suggests that for sufficiently low discount rates, policy makers should not impede the decline in real house prices, and this conclusion is reinforced by the finding that after a certain duration, house price slumps can become self-reinforcing. On the other hand, we also find evidence that during downturns, falling house prices can lead to lower private sector credit flows. Policy makers thus face a delicate balancing act. While they should not intervene to artifically prop up overvalued house prices, they should ensure that their macroeconomic and banking policies are such as to make a bottoming-out more likely. This suggests that they should keep real interest rates low, and ensure that banks are well-capitalised.
spellingShingle Bénétrix, A
Eichengreen, B
O'Rourke, K
How Housing Slumps End.
title How Housing Slumps End.
title_full How Housing Slumps End.
title_fullStr How Housing Slumps End.
title_full_unstemmed How Housing Slumps End.
title_short How Housing Slumps End.
title_sort how housing slumps end
work_keys_str_mv AT benetrixa howhousingslumpsend
AT eichengreenb howhousingslumpsend
AT orourkek howhousingslumpsend