Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism

I begin with the assumption that a philosophically significant tension exists today in feminist philosophy of religion between those subjects who seek to become divine and those who seek their identity in mutual recognition. My critical engagement with the ambiguous assertions of Luce Irigaray seeks...

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Main Author: Anderson, P
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Springer 2006
Subjects:
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author Anderson, P
author_facet Anderson, P
author_sort Anderson, P
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description I begin with the assumption that a philosophically significant tension exists today in feminist philosophy of religion between those subjects who seek to become divine and those who seek their identity in mutual recognition. My critical engagement with the ambiguous assertions of Luce Irigaray seeks to demonstrate, one the one hand, that a woman needs to recognize her own identity but, on the other hand, that each subject whether male or female must struggle in relation to the other in order to maintain realism about life and death. No one can avoid the recognition that we are each given life but each of us also dies. In addition, I raise a more general, philosophical problem for analytic philosophers who attempt to read Continental philosophy of religion: how should philosophers interpret deliberately ambiguous assertions? For example, what does Irigaray mean in asserting. 'Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign'? To find an answer, I turn to the distinctively French readings of the Hegelian struggle for recognition which have preoccupied Continental philosophers especially since the first half of the last century. I explore the struggle for mutual recognition between womrn and men who must face the reality of life and death in order to avoid the projection of their fear of mortality onto the other sex. This includes a critical look at Irigaray's account of subjectivity and divinity. I turn to the French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff in order to shift the focus from divinity to intersubjectivity. I conclude that taking seriously the struggle for mutual recognition between subjects forces contemporary philosophers of religion to be realist in their living and dying. With this in mind, the lesson from the Continent for philosophy of religion is that we must not stop yearning for recognition. Indeed, we must event risk our autonomy/divinity in seeking to recognize intersubjectivity.
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spelling oxford-uuid:69853140-d6b0-49b9-a667-969f274a2bef2022-03-26T18:51:29ZLife, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminismJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:69853140-d6b0-49b9-a667-969f274a2befPhilosophy,psychology and sociology of religionPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetSpringer2006Anderson, PI begin with the assumption that a philosophically significant tension exists today in feminist philosophy of religion between those subjects who seek to become divine and those who seek their identity in mutual recognition. My critical engagement with the ambiguous assertions of Luce Irigaray seeks to demonstrate, one the one hand, that a woman needs to recognize her own identity but, on the other hand, that each subject whether male or female must struggle in relation to the other in order to maintain realism about life and death. No one can avoid the recognition that we are each given life but each of us also dies. In addition, I raise a more general, philosophical problem for analytic philosophers who attempt to read Continental philosophy of religion: how should philosophers interpret deliberately ambiguous assertions? For example, what does Irigaray mean in asserting. 'Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign'? To find an answer, I turn to the distinctively French readings of the Hegelian struggle for recognition which have preoccupied Continental philosophers especially since the first half of the last century. I explore the struggle for mutual recognition between womrn and men who must face the reality of life and death in order to avoid the projection of their fear of mortality onto the other sex. This includes a critical look at Irigaray's account of subjectivity and divinity. I turn to the French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff in order to shift the focus from divinity to intersubjectivity. I conclude that taking seriously the struggle for mutual recognition between subjects forces contemporary philosophers of religion to be realist in their living and dying. With this in mind, the lesson from the Continent for philosophy of religion is that we must not stop yearning for recognition. Indeed, we must event risk our autonomy/divinity in seeking to recognize intersubjectivity.
spellingShingle Philosophy,psychology and sociology of religion
Philosophy
Anderson, P
Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism
title Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism
title_full Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism
title_fullStr Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism
title_full_unstemmed Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism
title_short Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism
title_sort life death and inter subjectivity realism and recognition in continental feminism
topic Philosophy,psychology and sociology of religion
Philosophy
work_keys_str_mv AT andersonp lifedeathandintersubjectivityrealismandrecognitionincontinentalfeminism