Democratic enfranchisement beyond citizenship: the all-affected principle in theory and practice

<p>This is a collection of four papers about the All-Affected Principle (AAP): the view that every person whose morally weighty interests are affected by a democratic decision has the right to participate in that decision.</p> <p>The first paper (“Narrow Possibilism about Democrati...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zimmermann, A
Other Authors: Fabre, C
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: 2018
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Summary:<p>This is a collection of four papers about the All-Affected Principle (AAP): the view that every person whose morally weighty interests are affected by a democratic decision has the right to participate in that decision.</p> <p>The first paper (“Narrow Possibilism about Democratic Enfranchisement”) examines <em>how</em> we should distribute democratic participation rights: a plausible version of AAP must avoid treating unlike cases alike, which would be procedurally unfair. The solution is to distribute participation rights proportionately to the risk that a person’s interests will be affected. AAP thus implies an account of political equality that requires adherence to the ‘one person—one vote’ model <em>only if</em> interests are indeed equally affected.</p> <p>The second paper (“Economic Participation Rights and the AAP”) argues that AAP supporters have paid insufficient attention to <em>economic participation rights</em>. The exercise of such rights raises unique worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise is constrained by a number of duties.</p> <p>The third paper (“What AAP Is, and How (Not) to Fight It”) explores how AAP fares in light of possible objections from desirability and feasibility. Unlike crude versions of AAP, a plausibly restricted version of AAP cannot be dismissed as easily as many AAP sceptics may have thought. My reflections here are useful for AAP supporters and sceptics alike: this paper helps clarify what <em>kind of</em> objection can cast serious doubt on AAP.</p> <p>The fourth paper (“Criminal Disenfranchisement, Political Wrongdoing, and Affected Interests”) asks: is AAP compatible with criminal disenfranchisement? AAP, when endorsed <em>in combination with</em> a plausible theory of punishment, is compatible with disenfranchising a narrow set of criminal wrongdoers only: those guilty of ‘political wrongdoing’, which is wrong <em>primarily</em> because it undermines democratic procedures and institutions for private gain. The upshot is that current <em>blanket</em> policies of criminal disenfranchisement are incompatible with AAP.</p>