Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.

?This Paper studies the size and number of industrial clusters that will arise in a multi-country world in which, because of increasing returns to scale, one sector has a propensity to cluster. It compares the equilibrium with the world welfare maximum, showing that the equilibrium will generally ha...

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Main Authors: Norman, V, Venables, A
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: CEPR 2001
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author Norman, V
Venables, A
author_facet Norman, V
Venables, A
author_sort Norman, V
collection OXFORD
description ?This Paper studies the size and number of industrial clusters that will arise in a multi-country world in which, because of increasing returns to scale, one sector has a propensity to cluster. It compares the equilibrium with the world welfare maximum, showing that the equilibrium will generally have clusters that are too small, while there are possibly too many countries with a cluster. Allowing national governments to subsidize will move the equilibrium to the world welfare maximum, so there is no 'race to the bottom'. If subsidy rates were capped then there would be a proliferation of too many and too small clusters.
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spelling oxford-uuid:6af1426a-12b7-463c-8e36-da466169d2742022-03-26T19:00:35ZIndustrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:6af1426a-12b7-463c-8e36-da466169d274EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsCEPR2001Norman, VVenables, A?This Paper studies the size and number of industrial clusters that will arise in a multi-country world in which, because of increasing returns to scale, one sector has a propensity to cluster. It compares the equilibrium with the world welfare maximum, showing that the equilibrium will generally have clusters that are too small, while there are possibly too many countries with a cluster. Allowing national governments to subsidize will move the equilibrium to the world welfare maximum, so there is no 'race to the bottom'. If subsidy rates were capped then there would be a proliferation of too many and too small clusters.
spellingShingle Norman, V
Venables, A
Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.
title Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.
title_full Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.
title_fullStr Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.
title_full_unstemmed Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.
title_short Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy.
title_sort industrial clusters equilibrium welfare and policy
work_keys_str_mv AT normanv industrialclustersequilibriumwelfareandpolicy
AT venablesa industrialclustersequilibriumwelfareandpolicy