When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty

Political parties face a crucial trade-off between electoral and partisan goals: should they put electoral goals first, pursuing the policies they think will win them the most votes in the next election, or should they put partisan goals first, pursuing the policies their members, activists, and mos...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Lindvall, J, Rueda, D, Zhai, H
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2023
_version_ 1797111282410717184
author Lindvall, J
Rueda, D
Zhai, H
author_facet Lindvall, J
Rueda, D
Zhai, H
author_sort Lindvall, J
collection OXFORD
description Political parties face a crucial trade-off between electoral and partisan goals: should they put electoral goals first, pursuing the policies they think will win them the most votes in the next election, or should they put partisan goals first, pursuing the policies their members, activists, and most loyal voters prefer? In this paper we argue that main political parties make different choices depending on the information environment they are in. They have strong incentives to follow the median voter when the median voter's position is well known, but when there is more uncertainty they have strong incentives to adopt policies they prefer for partisan reasons, since uncertainty makes party leaders more willing to bet that the party's preferred policies are also vote winners. We develop an empirical analysis of how the main parties on the left and the right in twenty democracies have changed their platforms from election to election since the 1960s.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T08:06:34Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:6d3e1158-8367-467e-957e-c69a18173a25
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-07T08:06:34Z
publishDate 2023
publisher Cambridge University Press
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:6d3e1158-8367-467e-957e-c69a18173a252023-11-02T18:11:39ZWhen parties move to the middle: the role of uncertaintyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:6d3e1158-8367-467e-957e-c69a18173a25EnglishSymplectic ElementsCambridge University Press2023Lindvall, JRueda, DZhai, HPolitical parties face a crucial trade-off between electoral and partisan goals: should they put electoral goals first, pursuing the policies they think will win them the most votes in the next election, or should they put partisan goals first, pursuing the policies their members, activists, and most loyal voters prefer? In this paper we argue that main political parties make different choices depending on the information environment they are in. They have strong incentives to follow the median voter when the median voter's position is well known, but when there is more uncertainty they have strong incentives to adopt policies they prefer for partisan reasons, since uncertainty makes party leaders more willing to bet that the party's preferred policies are also vote winners. We develop an empirical analysis of how the main parties on the left and the right in twenty democracies have changed their platforms from election to election since the 1960s.
spellingShingle Lindvall, J
Rueda, D
Zhai, H
When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty
title When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty
title_full When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty
title_fullStr When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty
title_short When parties move to the middle: the role of uncertainty
title_sort when parties move to the middle the role of uncertainty
work_keys_str_mv AT lindvallj whenpartiesmovetothemiddletheroleofuncertainty
AT ruedad whenpartiesmovetothemiddletheroleofuncertainty
AT zhaih whenpartiesmovetothemiddletheroleofuncertainty