Secession with natural resources

We look at the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. Resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively l...

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Main Authors: Dhillon, A, Krishnan, P, Patnam, M, Perroni, C
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2020
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author Dhillon, A
Krishnan, P
Patnam, M
Perroni, C
author_facet Dhillon, A
Krishnan, P
Patnam, M
Perroni, C
author_sort Dhillon, A
collection OXFORD
description We look at the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. Resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources. We argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources. We describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post-breakup local outcomes.
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spelling oxford-uuid:6dfb0a5e-1560-469a-a270-e05bfaca3b6f2022-03-26T19:21:21ZSecession with natural resourcesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:6dfb0a5e-1560-469a-a270-e05bfaca3b6fEnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2020Dhillon, AKrishnan, PPatnam, MPerroni, CWe look at the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. Resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources. We argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources. We describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post-breakup local outcomes.
spellingShingle Dhillon, A
Krishnan, P
Patnam, M
Perroni, C
Secession with natural resources
title Secession with natural resources
title_full Secession with natural resources
title_fullStr Secession with natural resources
title_full_unstemmed Secession with natural resources
title_short Secession with natural resources
title_sort secession with natural resources
work_keys_str_mv AT dhillona secessionwithnaturalresources
AT krishnanp secessionwithnaturalresources
AT patnamm secessionwithnaturalresources
AT perronic secessionwithnaturalresources