The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information.
This paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information. The licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensee. It is shown that there is a unique equ...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
1992
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| _version_ | 1826278095503491072 |
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| author | Beggs, A |
| author_facet | Beggs, A |
| author_sort | Beggs, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information. The licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensee. It is shown that there is a unique equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion of I. Cho and D. Kreps (1987). Qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:38:49Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:6e98010c-f828-4272-94e5-7fb44af0f89f |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:38:49Z |
| publishDate | 1992 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:6e98010c-f828-4272-94e5-7fb44af0f89f2022-03-26T19:25:23ZThe Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:6e98010c-f828-4272-94e5-7fb44af0f89fEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsElsevier1992Beggs, AThis paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information. The licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensee. It is shown that there is a unique equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion of I. Cho and D. Kreps (1987). Qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types. |
| spellingShingle | Beggs, A The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information. |
| title | The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information. |
| title_full | The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information. |
| title_fullStr | The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information. |
| title_short | The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information. |
| title_sort | licensing of patents under asymmetric information |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT beggsa thelicensingofpatentsunderasymmetricinformation AT beggsa licensingofpatentsunderasymmetricinformation |