Uses and misuses of criminalisation
<p>Which uses of the power to criminalise are misuses of that power? When, in other words, is an exercise of the power to create a criminal offence an exercise of that power which cannot be morally justified? This thesis seeks to provide one part of the answer, by addressing an aspect of the q...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2011
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| _version_ | 1826278286583398400 |
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| author | Edwards, J |
| author2 | Gardner, J |
| author_facet | Gardner, J Edwards, J |
| author_sort | Edwards, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>Which uses of the power to criminalise are misuses of that power? When, in other words, is an exercise of the power to create a criminal offence an exercise of that power which cannot be morally justified? This thesis seeks to provide one part of the answer, by addressing an aspect of the question little discussed by criminal law theorists. Thus it seeks not classes of conduct which it is impermissible to criminalise, nor classes of objective which offence-creators cannot permissibly pursue. Rather the thesis addresses the distinct issue of means – of how criminal offences (are set up to) bring about their creators’ objectives. It asks which means of achieving objectives it is impermissible to employ or make available, and how the power to criminalise must be used to avoid their employment or availability.</p> <p>In answering these questions the thesis distinguishes a number of types of criminal offence, by reference to the means by which the tokens of each (are set up to) achieve objectives. The argument is that to create tokens of these types is often to misuse power, because it is often to employ, or make available, impermissible means. This judgment of impermissibility is a function of a number of principles of political morality, some of which are developed at length in the course of the thesis. No single principle (or set of principles) is presented as an absolute limit on the power to criminalise; but each is part of a complete picture of how that power can permissibly be used, and contributes to vindicating the thesis defended within these pages. That thesis, to repeat, is that some uses of criminalisation are no better than misuses, on account of the means by which the resulting offences (are set up to) achieve their creators’ ends.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:41:41Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:6f8c71da-bdcf-4412-aeaf-5463544b5908 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:41:41Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:6f8c71da-bdcf-4412-aeaf-5463544b59082022-03-26T19:31:20ZUses and misuses of criminalisationThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:6f8c71da-bdcf-4412-aeaf-5463544b5908LawEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2011Edwards, JGardner, JAshworth, A<p>Which uses of the power to criminalise are misuses of that power? When, in other words, is an exercise of the power to create a criminal offence an exercise of that power which cannot be morally justified? This thesis seeks to provide one part of the answer, by addressing an aspect of the question little discussed by criminal law theorists. Thus it seeks not classes of conduct which it is impermissible to criminalise, nor classes of objective which offence-creators cannot permissibly pursue. Rather the thesis addresses the distinct issue of means – of how criminal offences (are set up to) bring about their creators’ objectives. It asks which means of achieving objectives it is impermissible to employ or make available, and how the power to criminalise must be used to avoid their employment or availability.</p> <p>In answering these questions the thesis distinguishes a number of types of criminal offence, by reference to the means by which the tokens of each (are set up to) achieve objectives. The argument is that to create tokens of these types is often to misuse power, because it is often to employ, or make available, impermissible means. This judgment of impermissibility is a function of a number of principles of political morality, some of which are developed at length in the course of the thesis. No single principle (or set of principles) is presented as an absolute limit on the power to criminalise; but each is part of a complete picture of how that power can permissibly be used, and contributes to vindicating the thesis defended within these pages. That thesis, to repeat, is that some uses of criminalisation are no better than misuses, on account of the means by which the resulting offences (are set up to) achieve their creators’ ends.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Law Edwards, J Uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| title | Uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| title_full | Uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| title_fullStr | Uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| title_short | Uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| title_sort | uses and misuses of criminalisation |
| topic | Law |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT edwardsj usesandmisusesofcriminalisation |