Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending
It is known that greater social cohesion increases a group’s ability to enforce cooperation. Despite this, defectors often go unpunished and groups with social structures that are a priori favorable often fail. A critical distinction is required between the structural effect on ability versus willin...
| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Journal article |
| Lingua: | English |
| Pubblicazione: |
University of Chicago Press
2020
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| _version_ | 1826278382125449216 |
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| author | Sabin, N Reed-Tsochas, F |
| author_facet | Sabin, N Reed-Tsochas, F |
| author_sort | Sabin, N |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | It is known that greater social cohesion increases a group’s ability to enforce cooperation. Despite this, defectors often go unpunished and groups with social structures that are a priori favorable often fail. A critical distinction is required between the structural effect on ability versus willingness to punish. We develop a theoretical framework in which variation in a group’s social structure generates a tension between ability and willingness to enforce cooperation. Structures that promote ability to punish also often reduce interest in carrying out sanctions, thus changing collective outcomes. Our empirical analysis involves a well-defined cooperative dilemma: group lending in Sierra Leone. We complement statistical modelling, based on a dataset containing 5,487 group repayments, with ethnographic analysis. We find: (1) Structural cohesion only increases economic cooperation between borrowers to a point, beyond which unwillingness outweighs increased ability to punish, reducing group repayments. (2) Groups with disconnected subgroups perform worse on average. Although borrowers are more willing to punish defectors in the out-subgroup, they are unable to do so effectively. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:43:05Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:6ffac09f-fe05-43b0-9b4c-875856dbe0bb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:43:05Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | University of Chicago Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:6ffac09f-fe05-43b0-9b4c-875856dbe0bb2022-03-26T19:34:15ZAble but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lendingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:6ffac09f-fe05-43b0-9b4c-875856dbe0bbEnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Chicago Press2020Sabin, NReed-Tsochas, FIt is known that greater social cohesion increases a group’s ability to enforce cooperation. Despite this, defectors often go unpunished and groups with social structures that are a priori favorable often fail. A critical distinction is required between the structural effect on ability versus willingness to punish. We develop a theoretical framework in which variation in a group’s social structure generates a tension between ability and willingness to enforce cooperation. Structures that promote ability to punish also often reduce interest in carrying out sanctions, thus changing collective outcomes. Our empirical analysis involves a well-defined cooperative dilemma: group lending in Sierra Leone. We complement statistical modelling, based on a dataset containing 5,487 group repayments, with ethnographic analysis. We find: (1) Structural cohesion only increases economic cooperation between borrowers to a point, beyond which unwillingness outweighs increased ability to punish, reducing group repayments. (2) Groups with disconnected subgroups perform worse on average. Although borrowers are more willing to punish defectors in the out-subgroup, they are unable to do so effectively. |
| spellingShingle | Sabin, N Reed-Tsochas, F Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| title | Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| title_full | Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| title_fullStr | Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| title_full_unstemmed | Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| title_short | Able but unwilling to enforce: cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| title_sort | able but unwilling to enforce cooperative dilemmas in group lending |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sabinn ablebutunwillingtoenforcecooperativedilemmasingrouplending AT reedtsochasf ablebutunwillingtoenforcecooperativedilemmasingrouplending |