Market selection with an endogenous state
This paper explores market selection in general equilibrium when the state of the economy is endogenous. Analysis of consumer survival in this case requires solution of the model’s dynamics, for which evolutionary game theory can be useful; for instance, if the state and beliefs are Markovian and ut...
Autor principal: | Norman, TWL |
---|---|
Format: | Journal article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicat: |
Elsevier
2020
|
Ítems similars
-
The evolution of monetary equilibrium
per: Norman, TWL
Publicat: (2020) -
Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction
per: Norman, TWL
Publicat: (2019) -
The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
per: Norman, TWL
Publicat: (2022) -
Pigouvian algorithmic platform design
per: Norman, TWL
Publicat: (2023) -
On the selection of endogenous and exogenous signals
per: C. R. McCormick, et al.
Publicat: (2019-11-01)