Market selection with an endogenous state
This paper explores market selection in general equilibrium when the state of the economy is endogenous. Analysis of consumer survival in this case requires solution of the model’s dynamics, for which evolutionary game theory can be useful; for instance, if the state and beliefs are Markovian and ut...
Main Author: | Norman, TWL |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2020
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