Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition.
In an asymmetric war of attrition the players’ prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A “stochastic strength” ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be stronger ex ante, even though her rea...
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
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| _version_ | 1797075864158994432 |
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| author | Myatt, D |
| author_facet | Myatt, D |
| author_sort | Myatt, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In an asymmetric war of attrition the players’ prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A “stochastic strength” ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be stronger ex ante, even though her realized valuation may be lower ex post. Since the classic war of attrition exhibits multiple equilibria, the game is perturbed; for instance, by imposing an arbitrarily large time limit, or allowing for the arbitrarily small probability of players that are restricted to fighting forever. In the unique equilibrium of the perturbed game, a stochastically weaker player almost always “instantly exits” at the beginning, even though her valuation may be higher. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:56:14Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:7451916c-db98-49be-838a-053b03be3415 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:56:14Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7451916c-db98-49be-838a-053b03be34152022-03-26T20:01:57ZInstant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:7451916c-db98-49be-838a-053b03be3415EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2005Myatt, DIn an asymmetric war of attrition the players’ prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A “stochastic strength” ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be stronger ex ante, even though her realized valuation may be lower ex post. Since the classic war of attrition exhibits multiple equilibria, the game is perturbed; for instance, by imposing an arbitrarily large time limit, or allowing for the arbitrarily small probability of players that are restricted to fighting forever. In the unique equilibrium of the perturbed game, a stochastically weaker player almost always “instantly exits” at the beginning, even though her valuation may be higher. |
| spellingShingle | Myatt, D Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition. |
| title | Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition. |
| title_full | Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition. |
| title_fullStr | Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition. |
| title_short | Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition. |
| title_sort | instant exit from the asymmetric war of attrition |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT myattd instantexitfromtheasymmetricwarofattrition |