The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance
Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| التنسيق: | Journal article |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Oxford University Press
2023
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| _version_ | 1826312147627409408 |
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| author | Thornley, E |
| author_facet | Thornley, E |
| author_sort | Thornley, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:23:14Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:74f20f15-fdc3-451f-a84f-b4ebce4d10e9 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:23:14Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:74f20f15-fdc3-451f-a84f-b4ebce4d10e92024-02-08T09:44:45ZThe procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptanceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:74f20f15-fdc3-451f-a84f-b4ebce4d10e9EnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2023Thornley, EMany philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. |
| spellingShingle | Thornley, E The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance |
| title | The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance |
| title_full | The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance |
| title_fullStr | The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance |
| title_full_unstemmed | The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance |
| title_short | The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance |
| title_sort | procreation asymmetry improvable life avoidance and impairable life acceptance |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT thornleye theprocreationasymmetryimprovablelifeavoidanceandimpairablelifeacceptance AT thornleye procreationasymmetryimprovablelifeavoidanceandimpairablelifeacceptance |