| Summary: | Here is an influential argument for naturalism: moral properties play
causal roles in the natural world, and only naturalism can explain this phenomenon of
“moral causation”. Here, I show that this argument from moral causation cannot be
maintained. More specifically, the argument relies on the premise that only natural
properties can play causal roles in the natural world, but based on the existing
dialectic, the most likely way of defending that premise requires accepting claims
about causation that generate difficulties for naturalists’ attempts to explain moral
causation. Moreover, there are reasons to replace the premise that moral properties
play causal roles with the more general claim that moral properties play explanatory
roles, and such roles may or may not be causal roles. When the argument is suitably
revised, it supports the more general thesis that moral properties are real, which
leaves it open that they may or may not be natural properties.
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