Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements
We introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of R&D.; We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessi...
| Váldodahkkit: | , |
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| Materiálatiipa: | Journal article |
| Giella: | English |
| Almmustuhtton: |
Elsevier
2005
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| Fáttát: |
| _version_ | 1826279413057060864 |
|---|---|
| author | Leahy, D Neary, J |
| author_facet | Leahy, D Neary, J |
| author_sort | Leahy, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of R&D.; We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D;, and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:58:20Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:75077509-8667-4d30-9788-fe9764ca1c75 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:58:20Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:75077509-8667-4d30-9788-fe9764ca1c752022-03-26T20:06:51ZSymmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complementsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:75077509-8667-4d30-9788-fe9764ca1c75EconomicsEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetElsevier2005Leahy, DNeary, JWe introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of R&D.; We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D;, and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values. |
| spellingShingle | Economics Leahy, D Neary, J Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements |
| title | Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements |
| title_full | Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements |
| title_fullStr | Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements |
| title_full_unstemmed | Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements |
| title_short | Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements |
| title_sort | symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements |
| topic | Economics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT leahyd symmetricresearchjointventurescooperativesubstitutesandcomplements AT nearyj symmetricresearchjointventurescooperativesubstitutesandcomplements |