Efficiency and Equilibrium in Trial and Error Learning.
In trial and error learning, agents experiment with new strategies and adopt them with a probability that depends on their realized payoffs. Such rules are completely uncoupled, that is, each agent’s behaviour depends only on his own realized payoffs and not on the payoffs or actions of anyone else...
Autori principali: | Young, H, Pradelski, B |
---|---|
Natura: | Working paper |
Lingua: | English |
Pubblicazione: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2010
|
Documenti analoghi
-
Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
di: Young, H, et al.
Pubblicazione: (2010) -
Learning by Trial and Error
di: Young, H
Pubblicazione: (2010) -
Learning by trial and error.
di: Young, H
Pubblicazione: (2008) -
Learning by trial and error.
di: Young, H
Pubblicazione: (2009) -
Learning by trial and error
di: Young, H
Pubblicazione: (2008)