Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies
This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with...
Main Authors: | Coury, T, Petkov, V |
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Format: | Working paper |
Published: |
University of Oxford
2007
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