Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities
<br>The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite c...
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2014
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author | Parrott, M |
author_facet | Parrott, M |
author_sort | Parrott, M |
collection | OXFORD |
description | <br>The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more things are possible, given what is known, than non-delusional subjects do. I argue that this is a central way in which their thinking departs from ordinary cognition and that it cannot be characterized in Bayesian terms. Thus, in order to fully understand the cognitive processing involved in the Capgras delusion, we must move beyond Bayesianism.</br>
<br><strong>1. </strong>The Simple Bayesian Model</br>
<br><strong>2. </strong>Anomalous Evidence and the Capgras Delusion</br>
<br><strong>3. </strong>Impaired Reasoning</br>
<br><strong>4. </strong>Setting Priors</br>
<br><strong>5. </strong>Epistemic Modality</br>
<br><strong>6. </strong>Delusions of Possibility</br>
<br><strong>7. </strong>Delusions of Possibility in Different Contexts</br>
<br><strong>8. </strong>How Many Factors?</br> |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:00:46Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:75dbc73f-ad1f-4b36-9fad-caa069543c68 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:00:46Z |
publishDate | 2014 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:75dbc73f-ad1f-4b36-9fad-caa069543c682022-03-26T20:12:04ZBayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic PossibilitiesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:75dbc73f-ad1f-4b36-9fad-caa069543c68EnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press 2014Parrott, M<br>The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more things are possible, given what is known, than non-delusional subjects do. I argue that this is a central way in which their thinking departs from ordinary cognition and that it cannot be characterized in Bayesian terms. Thus, in order to fully understand the cognitive processing involved in the Capgras delusion, we must move beyond Bayesianism.</br> <br><strong>1. </strong>The Simple Bayesian Model</br> <br><strong>2. </strong>Anomalous Evidence and the Capgras Delusion</br> <br><strong>3. </strong>Impaired Reasoning</br> <br><strong>4. </strong>Setting Priors</br> <br><strong>5. </strong>Epistemic Modality</br> <br><strong>6. </strong>Delusions of Possibility</br> <br><strong>7. </strong>Delusions of Possibility in Different Contexts</br> <br><strong>8. </strong>How Many Factors?</br> |
spellingShingle | Parrott, M Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities |
title | Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities |
title_full | Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities |
title_fullStr | Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities |
title_full_unstemmed | Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities |
title_short | Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities |
title_sort | bayesian models delusional beliefs and epistemic possibilities |
work_keys_str_mv | AT parrottm bayesianmodelsdelusionalbeliefsandepistemicpossibilities |