Welfare-increasing monopolization

The conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand...

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Main Author: Cowan, S
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: University of Oxford 2023
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author Cowan, S
author_facet Cowan, S
author_sort Cowan, S
collection OXFORD
description The conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand to be sufficiently concave, and cannot hold when demand is convex. When there are no vertical issues an efficient monopoly can yield higher social welfare than an asymmetric Cournot duopoly as long as demand is logconcave. In general greater demand concavity increases the relative importance of the benefit of redistributing output to the efficient firm.
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spelling oxford-uuid:769ffd1f-c68a-4770-b4df-6242a33cd4402023-04-18T12:29:44ZWelfare-increasing monopolizationWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:769ffd1f-c68a-4770-b4df-6242a33cd440EnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2023Cowan, SThe conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand to be sufficiently concave, and cannot hold when demand is convex. When there are no vertical issues an efficient monopoly can yield higher social welfare than an asymmetric Cournot duopoly as long as demand is logconcave. In general greater demand concavity increases the relative importance of the benefit of redistributing output to the efficient firm.
spellingShingle Cowan, S
Welfare-increasing monopolization
title Welfare-increasing monopolization
title_full Welfare-increasing monopolization
title_fullStr Welfare-increasing monopolization
title_full_unstemmed Welfare-increasing monopolization
title_short Welfare-increasing monopolization
title_sort welfare increasing monopolization
work_keys_str_mv AT cowans welfareincreasingmonopolization