The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence
Until 1970, the New York Stock Exchange prohibited public incorporation of member firms. After the rules were relaxed to allow joint stock firm membership, investment-banking concerns organized as partnerships or closely-held private corporations went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs (1999) the l...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2004
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| _version_ | 1797076788428406784 |
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| author | Morrison, A Wilhelm Jr, W |
| author_facet | Morrison, A Wilhelm Jr, W |
| author_sort | Morrison, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Until 1970, the New York Stock Exchange prohibited public incorporation of member firms. After the rules were relaxed to allow joint stock firm membership, investment-banking concerns organized as partnerships or closely-held private corporations went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs (1999) the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. In this paper we ask why the Investment Banks chose to float after 1970, and why they did so in waves. Our explanation extends previous work which examined the role of partnerships in fostering the formation of human capital (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2003). We examine in this context the effect of technological innovations which serve to replace or to undermine the role of the human capitalist and hence we provide a technological theory of the partnership's going-public decision. We support our theory with a new dataset of investment bank partnership statistics. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:08:45Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:787a21a5-3f85-4a2b-86a7-4d541f3c6628 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:08:45Z |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:787a21a5-3f85-4a2b-86a7-4d541f3c66282022-03-26T20:30:57ZThe demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidenceWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:787a21a5-3f85-4a2b-86a7-4d541f3c6628Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2004Morrison, AWilhelm Jr, WUntil 1970, the New York Stock Exchange prohibited public incorporation of member firms. After the rules were relaxed to allow joint stock firm membership, investment-banking concerns organized as partnerships or closely-held private corporations went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs (1999) the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. In this paper we ask why the Investment Banks chose to float after 1970, and why they did so in waves. Our explanation extends previous work which examined the role of partnerships in fostering the formation of human capital (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2003). We examine in this context the effect of technological innovations which serve to replace or to undermine the role of the human capitalist and hence we provide a technological theory of the partnership's going-public decision. We support our theory with a new dataset of investment bank partnership statistics. |
| spellingShingle | Morrison, A Wilhelm Jr, W The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence |
| title | The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence |
| title_full | The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence |
| title_fullStr | The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence |
| title_full_unstemmed | The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence |
| title_short | The demise of investment-banking partnerships: theory and evidence |
| title_sort | demise of investment banking partnerships theory and evidence |
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