Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis
Using a panel dataset covering a range of developed and developing countries, we show that common law systems were more protective of shareholder interests than civil law ones in the period 1995-2005. However, civilian systems were catching up, suggesting that civil law origin was not much of an obs...
Main Authors: | Armour, J, Deakin, S, Sarkar, P, Siems, M, Singh, A |
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Format: | Journal article |
Published: |
2009
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