Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games
It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have "prosocial preferences" that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games,...
主要な著者: | Burton-Chellew, M, West, S |
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フォーマット: | Journal article |
言語: | English |
出版事項: |
National Academy of Sciences
2012
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