Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard
Fiona Woollard argues that when one is personally involved in an emergency, one has a moral requirement to make substantial sacrifices to aid others that one would not otherwise have. She holds that there are three ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being physically p...
| 主要な著者: | , |
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| フォーマット: | Journal article |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Oxford University Press
2019
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| _version_ | 1826312773234065408 |
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| author | Pummer, T Crisp, R |
| author_facet | Pummer, T Crisp, R |
| author_sort | Pummer, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Fiona Woollard argues that when one is personally involved in an emergency, one has a moral requirement to make substantial sacrifices to aid others that one would not otherwise have. She holds that there are three ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being physically proximate to the victims of the emergency; by being the only person who can help the victims; or by having a personal encounter with the victims. Each of these factors is claimed to be defeasibly sufficient to ground personal involvement, and thus a requirement of substantial sacrifice to aid. Woollard defends this view on the basis of a number of cases. We show that Woollard's cases contain various confounding factors. In view of the more precisely drawn cases offered here, it is clear that neither proximity nor uniqueness nor personal encounter is intuitively defeasibly sufficient in the way Woollard claims. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:07:49Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:7c3a773a-ce57-4a89-8900-6b6fc58ec3f8 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-23T08:25:45Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7c3a773a-ce57-4a89-8900-6b6fc58ec3f82024-04-16T12:49:14ZRescue and personal involvement: a response to WoollardJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:7c3a773a-ce57-4a89-8900-6b6fc58ec3f8EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2019Pummer, TCrisp, RFiona Woollard argues that when one is personally involved in an emergency, one has a moral requirement to make substantial sacrifices to aid others that one would not otherwise have. She holds that there are three ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being physically proximate to the victims of the emergency; by being the only person who can help the victims; or by having a personal encounter with the victims. Each of these factors is claimed to be defeasibly sufficient to ground personal involvement, and thus a requirement of substantial sacrifice to aid. Woollard defends this view on the basis of a number of cases. We show that Woollard's cases contain various confounding factors. In view of the more precisely drawn cases offered here, it is clear that neither proximity nor uniqueness nor personal encounter is intuitively defeasibly sufficient in the way Woollard claims. |
| spellingShingle | Pummer, T Crisp, R Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard |
| title | Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard |
| title_full | Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard |
| title_fullStr | Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard |
| title_short | Rescue and personal involvement: a response to Woollard |
| title_sort | rescue and personal involvement a response to woollard |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pummert rescueandpersonalinvolvementaresponsetowoollard AT crispr rescueandpersonalinvolvementaresponsetowoollard |