Supervision and project performance: a principal-agent approach
This paper applies and extends principal-agent theory to analyze the performance of donor projects. As in many situations, there is variation in the degree of divergence between the interests of the donor (the principal) and the recipient government (the agent). Further, the effort expended on super...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Chauvet, L, Collier, P, Fuster, A |
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Μορφή: | Working paper |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
2008
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Θέματα: |
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