Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge?
Kant, in his third Critique, confronts the issue of how rule-governed objective judgement is possible. He argues that it requires a particular kind of aesthetic response to one's experience. I dub this response 'the Feeling of Unity', and I raise the question whether it is a type of i...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2007
|
| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1797077715278364672 |
|---|---|
| author | Moore, A |
| author2 | Royal Institute of Philosophy |
| author_facet | Royal Institute of Philosophy Moore, A |
| author_sort | Moore, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Kant, in his third Critique, confronts the issue of how rule-governed objective judgement is possible. He argues that it requires a particular kind of aesthetic response to one's experience. I dub this response 'the Feeling of Unity', and I raise the question whether it is a type of inexpressible knowledge. Using David Bell's account of these matters as a touchstone, I argue that it is. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:21:56Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:7cdae813-205e-46f9-9cdb-10ed5002d3cb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:21:56Z |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7cdae813-205e-46f9-9cdb-10ed5002d3cb2022-03-26T20:59:38ZIs the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:7cdae813-205e-46f9-9cdb-10ed5002d3cbPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetCambridge University Press2007Moore, ARoyal Institute of PhilosophyKant, in his third Critique, confronts the issue of how rule-governed objective judgement is possible. He argues that it requires a particular kind of aesthetic response to one's experience. I dub this response 'the Feeling of Unity', and I raise the question whether it is a type of inexpressible knowledge. Using David Bell's account of these matters as a touchstone, I argue that it is. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Moore, A Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge? |
| title | Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge? |
| title_full | Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge? |
| title_fullStr | Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge? |
| title_short | Is the Feeling of Unity that Kant identifies in his third Critique a type of inexpressible knowledge? |
| title_sort | is the feeling of unity that kant identifies in his third critique a type of inexpressible knowledge |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT moorea isthefeelingofunitythatkantidentifiesinhisthirdcritiqueatypeofinexpressibleknowledge |