Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence
Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Routledge
2005
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| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1797077827698294784 |
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| author | Dainton, B Bayne, T |
| author2 | Australasian Association of Philosophy |
| author_facet | Australasian Association of Philosophy Dainton, B Bayne, T |
| author_sort | Dainton, B |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. We then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and respond to a number of objections. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:23:37Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:7d5e1a0a-76e0-4907-8e6c-7cc62793f6ee |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:23:37Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7d5e1a0a-76e0-4907-8e6c-7cc62793f6ee2022-03-26T21:03:12ZConsciousness as a guide to personal persistenceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:7d5e1a0a-76e0-4907-8e6c-7cc62793f6eePhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetRoutledge2005Dainton, BBayne, TAustralasian Association of PhilosophyMentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. We then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and respond to a number of objections. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Dainton, B Bayne, T Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| title | Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| title_full | Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| title_fullStr | Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| title_short | Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| title_sort | consciousness as a guide to personal persistence |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT daintonb consciousnessasaguidetopersonalpersistence AT baynet consciousnessasaguidetopersonalpersistence |