How wrong is Paternalism?
In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concern...
| Egile nagusia: | |
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| Formatua: | Journal article |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2018
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| _version_ | 1826281122094383104 |
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| author | Birks, D |
| author_facet | Birks, D |
| author_sort | Birks, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concerning an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions. I demonstrate that this assumption cannot be grounded by wellbeing reasons, and that autonomy-based reasons of non-interference also cannot adequately explain the difference. Following this, I propose that the difference in the reasons related to an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions can be explained by the value of holding a person responsible for his choices. Nonetheless, this does not result in paternalistic behavior that interferes with autonomy being all things considered wrong. Instead, I show that the reason to hold a person responsible for a diminution of his wellbeing does not necessarily defeat the wellbeing reasons that count in favor of paternalistic behavior. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:24:02Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:7d8224e3-fe71-4803-80b6-cf8d1c527e98 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:24:02Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Brill Academic Publishers |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7d8224e3-fe71-4803-80b6-cf8d1c527e982022-03-26T21:04:08ZHow wrong is Paternalism?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:7d8224e3-fe71-4803-80b6-cf8d1c527e98Symplectic Elements at OxfordBrill Academic Publishers2018Birks, DIn this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concerning an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions. I demonstrate that this assumption cannot be grounded by wellbeing reasons, and that autonomy-based reasons of non-interference also cannot adequately explain the difference. Following this, I propose that the difference in the reasons related to an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions can be explained by the value of holding a person responsible for his choices. Nonetheless, this does not result in paternalistic behavior that interferes with autonomy being all things considered wrong. Instead, I show that the reason to hold a person responsible for a diminution of his wellbeing does not necessarily defeat the wellbeing reasons that count in favor of paternalistic behavior. |
| spellingShingle | Birks, D How wrong is Paternalism? |
| title | How wrong is Paternalism? |
| title_full | How wrong is Paternalism? |
| title_fullStr | How wrong is Paternalism? |
| title_full_unstemmed | How wrong is Paternalism? |
| title_short | How wrong is Paternalism? |
| title_sort | how wrong is paternalism |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT birksd howwrongispaternalism |