Cheap talk with two-sided private information
This paper studies how the transmission of information from a biased expert to a decision maker is affected when the latter has access to an unbiased symmetric private signal. The extra information has two distinct effects on the expert's incentives to communicate. First, there is an informatio...
Главный автор: | Moreno de Barreda, I |
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Формат: | Journal article |
Язык: | English |
Опубликовано: |
Elsevier
2024
|
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