| Summary: | William Ockham is a reductionist about time. He maintains that time somehow exists but is not a basic thing in his ontology. In this paper I present the specific nature of Ockham’s reductionism, setting it in its relevant medieval context. The main ingredient of this context is the issue of the distinction between permanent and successive things. Permanent things are those the parts of which can all exist at the same time, whereas successive things are those the parts of which can only exist one after another in time. Time, together with change, is classified as a successive thing. What is matter of debate is the ontological status of successive things. Medieval realists (for example, Walter Burley, Ockham’s fiercest enemy) maintain that successive things are distinct from and not reducible to permanent things. Some of them also argue that change and time are two distinct and irreducible successive things. Ockham denies both the claim that successive things are distinct from permanent things and the claim that change and time are two distinct (successive) things. In his view, both change and time are reducible to permanent things and to the same set of permanent things, so that there is not a mind-independent distinction between change and time. In this paper I first explain the notions of permanent and successive things. I then present the two main lines of attack of Ockham against successive things. I finally focus on his reductionism of time and change to permanent things.
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