Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting.
An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cyc...
| Glavni autor: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working paper |
| Jezik: | English |
| Izdano: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
|
| _version_ | 1826281521244274688 |
|---|---|
| author | Roberts, K |
| author_facet | Roberts, K |
| author_sort | Roberts, K |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:30:03Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:7f73e637-a037-4b06-b197-d94906f8d50a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:30:03Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7f73e637-a037-4b06-b197-d94906f8d50a2022-03-26T21:17:05ZCondorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:7f73e637-a037-4b06-b197-d94906f8d50aEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2005Roberts, KAn intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. The possibility of cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three person, three state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner. |
| spellingShingle | Roberts, K Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. |
| title | Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. |
| title_full | Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. |
| title_fullStr | Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. |
| title_short | Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting. |
| title_sort | condorcet cycles a model of intertemporal voting |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT robertsk condorcetcyclesamodelofintertemporalvoting |