The contingent a priori: a reply

In 'Reference and Contingency', Monist 62 (1979) pp. 161-89, Gareth Evans tried to explain how a priori knowledge of contingent truths is possible by arguing that indexical features of the truths in question make them contingent only in a superficial sense. In 'The Contingent A Priori...

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Main Author: Williamson, T
Other Authors: Analysis Trust
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Blackwell Publishing 1988
Subjects:
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author Williamson, T
author2 Analysis Trust
author_facet Analysis Trust
Williamson, T
author_sort Williamson, T
collection OXFORD
description In 'Reference and Contingency', Monist 62 (1979) pp. 161-89, Gareth Evans tried to explain how a priori knowledge of contingent truths is possible by arguing that indexical features of the truths in question make them contingent only in a superficial sense. In 'The Contingent A Priori: Has it Anything to do with Indexicals?', ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 113-7, I suggested that his explanation is inadequate, since a priori knowledge is also possible of deeply contingent truths with no relevant indexical features. Graham Oppy disagrees; in 'Williamson and the Contingent A Priori', ANALYSIS 47.4, October 1987, pp. 188-93, he claims to have detected hidden indexicality in my examples. I argued that beliefs formed by the following method (M) constitute a priori knowledge: (M) Given a valid deduction from the premiss that someone believes that P to the conclusion that P, believe that P. If one puts 'There is at least one believer' for 'P', the a priori knowledge is of a non-indexical contingent truth. It will not be necessary to rehearse the details of this argument in order to explain why I do not find Oppy's objections persuasive.
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spelling oxford-uuid:7f9414fc-da1b-4c96-bded-81f3ad46a5a02022-03-26T21:17:46ZThe contingent a priori: a replyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:7f9414fc-da1b-4c96-bded-81f3ad46a5a0PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetBlackwell Publishing1988Williamson, TAnalysis TrustIn 'Reference and Contingency', Monist 62 (1979) pp. 161-89, Gareth Evans tried to explain how a priori knowledge of contingent truths is possible by arguing that indexical features of the truths in question make them contingent only in a superficial sense. In 'The Contingent A Priori: Has it Anything to do with Indexicals?', ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 113-7, I suggested that his explanation is inadequate, since a priori knowledge is also possible of deeply contingent truths with no relevant indexical features. Graham Oppy disagrees; in 'Williamson and the Contingent A Priori', ANALYSIS 47.4, October 1987, pp. 188-93, he claims to have detected hidden indexicality in my examples. I argued that beliefs formed by the following method (M) constitute a priori knowledge: (M) Given a valid deduction from the premiss that someone believes that P to the conclusion that P, believe that P. If one puts 'There is at least one believer' for 'P', the a priori knowledge is of a non-indexical contingent truth. It will not be necessary to rehearse the details of this argument in order to explain why I do not find Oppy's objections persuasive.
spellingShingle Philosophy
Williamson, T
The contingent a priori: a reply
title The contingent a priori: a reply
title_full The contingent a priori: a reply
title_fullStr The contingent a priori: a reply
title_full_unstemmed The contingent a priori: a reply
title_short The contingent a priori: a reply
title_sort contingent a priori a reply
topic Philosophy
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AT williamsont contingentaprioriareply