Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy

We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.

Detaylı Bibliyografya
Asıl Yazarlar: Leahy, D, Neary, J
Materyal Türü: Journal article
Dil:English
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Elsevier 2004
Konular:
Diğer Bilgiler
Özet:We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.