Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.
Principais autores: | Leahy, D, Neary, J |
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Formato: | Journal article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicado em: |
Elsevier
2004
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Assuntos: |
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