Rejecting epiphobia
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2020
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| _version_ | 1826281573445533696 |
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| author | Baysan, E |
| author_facet | Baysan, E |
| author_sort | Baysan, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked.
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| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:30:50Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:7fbd5b28-75b7-4547-94ca-78ce70b8213b |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:30:50Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:7fbd5b28-75b7-4547-94ca-78ce70b8213b2022-03-26T21:18:50ZRejecting epiphobiaJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:7fbd5b28-75b7-4547-94ca-78ce70b8213bEnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2020Baysan, EEpiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked. |
| spellingShingle | Baysan, E Rejecting epiphobia |
| title | Rejecting epiphobia |
| title_full | Rejecting epiphobia |
| title_fullStr | Rejecting epiphobia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rejecting epiphobia |
| title_short | Rejecting epiphobia |
| title_sort | rejecting epiphobia |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT baysane rejectingepiphobia |