A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
<p>Recently attempts have been made to extend the Dolev-Yao security model by allowing an intruder to learn weak secrets, such as poorly-chosen passwords, by off-line guessing. In such an attack, the intruder is able to verify a guessed value g if he can use it to produce a value called a veri...
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Natura: | Report |
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Oxford University Computing Laboratory
2005
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author | Newcomb, T Lowe, G |
author_facet | Newcomb, T Lowe, G |
author_sort | Newcomb, T |
collection | OXFORD |
description | <p>Recently attempts have been made to extend the Dolev-Yao security model by allowing an intruder to learn weak secrets, such as poorly-chosen passwords, by off-line guessing. In such an attack, the intruder is able to verify a guessed value g if he can use it to produce a value called a verifier. In such a case we say that g is verifier-producing. The definition was formed by inspection of known guessing attacks.</p><p>A more intuitive definition might be formed as follows: a value is verifiable if there exists some computational process that can somehow recognise a correct guess over any other value.</p><p>We formalise this intuitive definition, and use it to justify the soundness and completeness of the existing definition. Specifically we show that a value is recognisable if and only if the value is either already Dolev-Yao deducible or it is verifier-producing. In order to do this it was necessary to clarify the definition of verifier production slightly, revealing an ambiguity in the original definition.</p> |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:32:05Z |
format | Report |
id | oxford-uuid:8026bb05-f631-4523-8511-eaab24d05ec7 |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:32:05Z |
publishDate | 2005 |
publisher | Oxford University Computing Laboratory |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:8026bb05-f631-4523-8511-eaab24d05ec72022-03-26T21:21:29ZA computational justification for guessing attack formalismsReporthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_93fcuuid:8026bb05-f631-4523-8511-eaab24d05ec7Department of Computer ScienceOxford University Computing Laboratory2005Newcomb, TLowe, G<p>Recently attempts have been made to extend the Dolev-Yao security model by allowing an intruder to learn weak secrets, such as poorly-chosen passwords, by off-line guessing. In such an attack, the intruder is able to verify a guessed value g if he can use it to produce a value called a verifier. In such a case we say that g is verifier-producing. The definition was formed by inspection of known guessing attacks.</p><p>A more intuitive definition might be formed as follows: a value is verifiable if there exists some computational process that can somehow recognise a correct guess over any other value.</p><p>We formalise this intuitive definition, and use it to justify the soundness and completeness of the existing definition. Specifically we show that a value is recognisable if and only if the value is either already Dolev-Yao deducible or it is verifier-producing. In order to do this it was necessary to clarify the definition of verifier production slightly, revealing an ambiguity in the original definition.</p> |
spellingShingle | Newcomb, T Lowe, G A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
title | A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
title_full | A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
title_fullStr | A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
title_full_unstemmed | A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
title_short | A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
title_sort | computational justification for guessing attack formalisms |
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