A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms

<p>Recently attempts have been made to extend the Dolev-Yao security model by allowing an intruder to learn weak secrets, such as poorly-chosen passwords, by off-line guessing. In such an attack, the intruder is able to verify a guessed value g if he can use it to produce a value called a veri...

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Autori principali: Newcomb, T, Lowe, G
Natura: Report
Pubblicazione: Oxford University Computing Laboratory 2005
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author Newcomb, T
Lowe, G
author_facet Newcomb, T
Lowe, G
author_sort Newcomb, T
collection OXFORD
description <p>Recently attempts have been made to extend the Dolev-Yao security model by allowing an intruder to learn weak secrets, such as poorly-chosen passwords, by off-line guessing. In such an attack, the intruder is able to verify a guessed value g if he can use it to produce a value called a verifier. In such a case we say that g is verifier-producing. The definition was formed by inspection of known guessing attacks.</p><p>A more intuitive definition might be formed as follows: a value is verifiable if there exists some computational process that can somehow recognise a correct guess over any other value.</p><p>We formalise this intuitive definition, and use it to justify the soundness and completeness of the existing definition. Specifically we show that a value is recognisable if and only if the value is either already Dolev-Yao deducible or it is verifier-producing. In order to do this it was necessary to clarify the definition of verifier production slightly, revealing an ambiguity in the original definition.</p>
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spelling oxford-uuid:8026bb05-f631-4523-8511-eaab24d05ec72022-03-26T21:21:29ZA computational justification for guessing attack formalismsReporthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_93fcuuid:8026bb05-f631-4523-8511-eaab24d05ec7Department of Computer ScienceOxford University Computing Laboratory2005Newcomb, TLowe, G<p>Recently attempts have been made to extend the Dolev-Yao security model by allowing an intruder to learn weak secrets, such as poorly-chosen passwords, by off-line guessing. In such an attack, the intruder is able to verify a guessed value g if he can use it to produce a value called a verifier. In such a case we say that g is verifier-producing. The definition was formed by inspection of known guessing attacks.</p><p>A more intuitive definition might be formed as follows: a value is verifiable if there exists some computational process that can somehow recognise a correct guess over any other value.</p><p>We formalise this intuitive definition, and use it to justify the soundness and completeness of the existing definition. Specifically we show that a value is recognisable if and only if the value is either already Dolev-Yao deducible or it is verifier-producing. In order to do this it was necessary to clarify the definition of verifier production slightly, revealing an ambiguity in the original definition.</p>
spellingShingle Newcomb, T
Lowe, G
A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
title A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
title_full A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
title_fullStr A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
title_full_unstemmed A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
title_short A computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
title_sort computational justification for guessing attack formalisms
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