Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups
Societies are becoming more polarised, driven in part by misconceptions about out-groups’ beliefs. To understand these effects, one must examine the cognitive processes underlying how people think about others. Here, we investigate whether people are less prone to theorise about the minds of out-gro...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Payne, B, Bird, G, Catmur, C |
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Μορφή: | Journal article |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Springer Nature
2024
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Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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