Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking.
This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remunera...
Hovedforfatter: | Thanassoulis, J |
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Format: | Working paper |
Sprog: | English |
Udgivet: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2011
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Lignende værker
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Industrial structure, executives' pay and myopic risk taking
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Udgivet: (2011) -
Industry Structure, Executive Pay, and Short-Termism
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Bankers' Pay Structure And Risk.
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Bankers' pay structure and risk
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Bank pay caps, bank risk, and macroprudential regulation
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