Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking.
This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remunera...
Príomhchruthaitheoir: | Thanassoulis, J |
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Formáid: | Working paper |
Teanga: | English |
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2011
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