Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking.
This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remunera...
Tác giả chính: | Thanassoulis, J |
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Định dạng: | Working paper |
Ngôn ngữ: | English |
Được phát hành: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2011
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