Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet.
Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protec...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2007
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| _version_ | 1826282001606377472 |
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| author | Dewan, T Myatt, D |
| author_facet | Dewan, T Myatt, D |
| author_sort | Dewan, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes discourage activism: it enhances the value of a minister's career and hence encourages him to "sit tight" by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to "live for today" by pursuing controversial policies. The prime minister's ability to protect ministers is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet; the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:37:17Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:81dbc7cf-ef70-438c-89a7-573855e28dfe |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:37:17Z |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:81dbc7cf-ef70-438c-89a7-573855e28dfe2022-03-26T21:33:06ZScandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:81dbc7cf-ef70-438c-89a7-573855e28dfeEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2007Dewan, TMyatt, DEmpirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes discourage activism: it enhances the value of a minister's career and hence encourages him to "sit tight" by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to "live for today" by pursuing controversial policies. The prime minister's ability to protect ministers is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet; the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role. |
| spellingShingle | Dewan, T Myatt, D Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet. |
| title | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet. |
| title_full | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet. |
| title_fullStr | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet. |
| title_short | Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet. |
| title_sort | scandal protection and recovery in the cabinet |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dewant scandalprotectionandrecoveryinthecabinet AT myattd scandalprotectionandrecoveryinthecabinet |