Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Noe, T
Format: Journal article
Published: 2009
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author Noe, T
author_facet Noe, T
author_sort Noe, T
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spelling oxford-uuid:821635db-90e8-4769-a29e-3beda09581dd2022-03-26T21:34:54ZTunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensationJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:821635db-90e8-4769-a29e-3beda09581ddSocial Sciences Division - Daisy2009Noe, T
spellingShingle Noe, T
Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation
title Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation
title_full Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation
title_fullStr Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation
title_full_unstemmed Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation
title_short Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: transparency, temptation, and the design of executive compensation
title_sort tunnel proofing the executive suite transparency temptation and the design of executive compensation
work_keys_str_mv AT noet tunnelproofingtheexecutivesuitetransparencytemptationandthedesignofexecutivecompensation