Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies
We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and...
| Egile Nagusiak: | , |
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| Beste egile batzuk: | |
| Formatua: | Journal article |
| Hizkuntza: | English |
| Argitaratua: |
Blackwell Publishing
2000
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| Gaiak: |
| _version_ | 1826282294062612480 |
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| author | Neary, J Leahy, D |
| author2 | Royal Economic Society |
| author_facet | Royal Economic Society Neary, J Leahy, D |
| author_sort | Neary, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's ‘animal spirits’ taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D; spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:41:40Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:833ed979-cdbc-4505-bb07-4a38b32de09e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:41:40Z |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:833ed979-cdbc-4505-bb07-4a38b32de09e2022-03-26T21:42:56ZStrategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopoliesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:833ed979-cdbc-4505-bb07-4a38b32de09eEconomicsEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetBlackwell Publishing2000Neary, JLeahy, DRoyal Economic SocietyWe characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's ‘animal spirits’ taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D; spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies. |
| spellingShingle | Economics Neary, J Leahy, D Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| title | Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| title_full | Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| title_fullStr | Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| title_short | Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| title_sort | strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies |
| topic | Economics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nearyj strategictradeandindustrialpolicytowardsdynamicoligopolies AT leahyd strategictradeandindustrialpolicytowardsdynamicoligopolies |