The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.

Such problems as inner-city traffic congestion and pollution are often asserted to be examples of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma Game (PD), but there is a dearth of empirical research that tests this assertion. 551 car owners in Oxford responded to three pairs of alternatives designed as traff...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Joshi, M, Joshi, V, Lamb, R
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 2005
_version_ 1797079327930580992
author Joshi, M
Joshi, V
Lamb, R
author_facet Joshi, M
Joshi, V
Lamb, R
author_sort Joshi, M
collection OXFORD
description Such problems as inner-city traffic congestion and pollution are often asserted to be examples of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma Game (PD), but there is a dearth of empirical research that tests this assertion. 551 car owners in Oxford responded to three pairs of alternatives designed as traffic versions of the four outcomes of the PD, by stating which alternative in each pair they preferred. Only 2% of respondents showed the full set of preferences which fit the PD. Four sets of preferences were common and accounted for 93% of responses suggesting that no single canonical game structure represents the traffic problem. The most common set of preferences, shown by 48% of respondents, fitted an "Assurance Game". The results imply that the current city-centre traffic problem may be in substantial part due to lack of assurance and trust rather than raw self-interest. The public policy implications of the results are discussed.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T00:44:17Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:84145070-49f8-43cf-94fe-29ac98ac5c91
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-07T00:44:17Z
publishDate 2005
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:84145070-49f8-43cf-94fe-29ac98ac5c912022-03-26T21:48:44ZThe Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:84145070-49f8-43cf-94fe-29ac98ac5c91EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2005Joshi, MJoshi, VLamb, RSuch problems as inner-city traffic congestion and pollution are often asserted to be examples of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma Game (PD), but there is a dearth of empirical research that tests this assertion. 551 car owners in Oxford responded to three pairs of alternatives designed as traffic versions of the four outcomes of the PD, by stating which alternative in each pair they preferred. Only 2% of respondents showed the full set of preferences which fit the PD. Four sets of preferences were common and accounted for 93% of responses suggesting that no single canonical game structure represents the traffic problem. The most common set of preferences, shown by 48% of respondents, fitted an "Assurance Game". The results imply that the current city-centre traffic problem may be in substantial part due to lack of assurance and trust rather than raw self-interest. The public policy implications of the results are discussed.
spellingShingle Joshi, M
Joshi, V
Lamb, R
The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.
title The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.
title_full The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.
title_fullStr The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.
title_full_unstemmed The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.
title_short The Prisoners' Dilemma and City-Centre Traffic.
title_sort prisoners dilemma and city centre traffic
work_keys_str_mv AT joshim theprisonersdilemmaandcitycentretraffic
AT joshiv theprisonersdilemmaandcitycentretraffic
AT lambr theprisonersdilemmaandcitycentretraffic
AT joshim prisonersdilemmaandcitycentretraffic
AT joshiv prisonersdilemmaandcitycentretraffic
AT lambr prisonersdilemmaandcitycentretraffic