Uncommon knowledge
<p>This dissertation collects four papers on common knowledge and one on introspection principles in epistemic game theory. The first two papers offer a sustained argument against the importance of common knowledge and belief in explaining social behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 study the role of co...
| Glavni avtor: | |
|---|---|
| Drugi avtorji: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Jezik: | English |
| Izdano: |
2014
|
| Teme: |
| _version_ | 1826312975731916800 |
|---|---|
| author | Lederman, H |
| author2 | Arntzenius, F |
| author_facet | Arntzenius, F Lederman, H |
| author_sort | Lederman, H |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>This dissertation collects four papers on common knowledge and one on introspection principles in epistemic game theory. The first two papers offer a sustained argument against the importance of common knowledge and belief in explaining social behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 study the role of common knowledge of tautologies in standard models in epistemic logic and game theory. The first considers the problem as it relates to Robert Aumann’s Agreement Theorem; the second (joint work with Peter Fritz) studies it in models of awareness. The fifth paper corrects a claimed Agreement Theorem of Geanakoplos (1989), and exploits the corrected theorem to provide epistemic conditions for correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:44:57Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:844c4fc7-1cef-4bdb-b559-c6a167fd10c4 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:03:43Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:844c4fc7-1cef-4bdb-b559-c6a167fd10c42024-05-14T15:19:06ZUncommon knowledgeThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:844c4fc7-1cef-4bdb-b559-c6a167fd10c4EpistemologyhumankindcausationEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2014Lederman, HArntzenius, FWilliamson, T<p>This dissertation collects four papers on common knowledge and one on introspection principles in epistemic game theory. The first two papers offer a sustained argument against the importance of common knowledge and belief in explaining social behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 study the role of common knowledge of tautologies in standard models in epistemic logic and game theory. The first considers the problem as it relates to Robert Aumann’s Agreement Theorem; the second (joint work with Peter Fritz) studies it in models of awareness. The fifth paper corrects a claimed Agreement Theorem of Geanakoplos (1989), and exploits the corrected theorem to provide epistemic conditions for correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Epistemology humankind causation Lederman, H Uncommon knowledge |
| title | Uncommon knowledge |
| title_full | Uncommon knowledge |
| title_fullStr | Uncommon knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed | Uncommon knowledge |
| title_short | Uncommon knowledge |
| title_sort | uncommon knowledge |
| topic | Epistemology humankind causation |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ledermanh uncommonknowledge |