| Resumo: | Trainee pay plays an important role in the economics of training, but how it varies across time and place is not well understood, neither in terms of both processes (pay setting) or outcomes (pay rates). This paper draws on a research project on initial training, specifically apprenticeship, in two sectors (metalworking and retailing) in three countries (Britain, Germany, and Switzerland). Germany excepted, apprentices are less often covered by collective bargaining than are regular employees and other trainees, but they are frequently paid performance-related bonuses in all countries. The pay of trainees (relative to that of skilled employees) is low in Switzerland, middling in Germany, and high in Britain, and higher in retailing than engineering. These differences are associated with: the content of training and pay differentials by skill; the age of trainees; the nature of training contracts; collective bargaining coverage; the appeal of apprenticeship to young people; public subsidies; and monopsony power. The high pay of trainees in Britain is attributed primarily to supply shortages, and, in retailing, to low and uncertain training standards. The low pay of apprentices in Switzerland reflects the low age of entry to training, restricted access to full-time upper secondary education, and probably also the power of employers in the training market. Trade unions should not be viewed as generally seeking higher pay for trainees, leading to wage compression.
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