An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining.
Individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They make their deman ds by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly. There is no common knowledge. Over the long run, typically one...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
1993
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| _version_ | 1797079946274799616 |
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| author | Young, H |
| author_facet | Young, H |
| author_sort | Young, H |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They make their deman ds by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly. There is no common knowledge. Over the long run, typically one division will be observe d almost all of the time. This "stochastically stable" division is close to the Nash solution when all agents in the same population ar e alike. When the populations are heterogeneous, a generalization of t he Nash solution results. If there is some mixing between the two populations, the stable division is fifty-fifty. (c) 1993 Academic Press, Inc. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:53:09Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:87164744-5995-45a6-95bd-8df4217b811f |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:53:09Z |
| publishDate | 1993 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:87164744-5995-45a6-95bd-8df4217b811f2022-03-26T22:08:25ZAn Evolutionary Model of Bargaining.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:87164744-5995-45a6-95bd-8df4217b811fEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsElsevier1993Young, HIndividuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They make their deman ds by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly. There is no common knowledge. Over the long run, typically one division will be observe d almost all of the time. This "stochastically stable" division is close to the Nash solution when all agents in the same population ar e alike. When the populations are heterogeneous, a generalization of t he Nash solution results. If there is some mixing between the two populations, the stable division is fifty-fifty. (c) 1993 Academic Press, Inc. |
| spellingShingle | Young, H An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. |
| title | An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. |
| title_full | An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. |
| title_fullStr | An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. |
| title_short | An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. |
| title_sort | evolutionary model of bargaining |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT youngh anevolutionarymodelofbargaining AT youngh evolutionarymodelofbargaining |