Ownership and Control of German Corporations.

In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The stat...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Franks, J, Mayer, C
Format: Journal article
Langue:English
Publié: 2001
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author Franks, J
Mayer, C
author_facet Franks, J
Mayer, C
author_sort Franks, J
collection OXFORD
description In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.
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spelling oxford-uuid:871e3c26-9a3d-4efc-a329-30a3f4b93b192022-03-26T22:08:40ZOwnership and Control of German Corporations.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:871e3c26-9a3d-4efc-a329-30a3f4b93b19EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints2001Franks, JMayer, CIn a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.
spellingShingle Franks, J
Mayer, C
Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
title Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
title_full Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
title_fullStr Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
title_full_unstemmed Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
title_short Ownership and Control of German Corporations.
title_sort ownership and control of german corporations
work_keys_str_mv AT franksj ownershipandcontrolofgermancorporations
AT mayerc ownershipandcontrolofgermancorporations