The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will?
<p>The elephant in the room during the recovery fund negotiations was, once again, the rule of law. This paper will address a question of great constitutional importance: is it possible to force Member States to respect the Union’s “fundamental values”? It will begin by laying out three of the...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | Spanish English |
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Universidad de Sevilla
2020
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| _version_ | 1797111498623942656 |
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| author | Íñiguez, G |
| author_facet | Íñiguez, G |
| author_sort | Íñiguez, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>The elephant in the room during the recovery fund negotiations was, once again, the rule of law. This paper will address a question of great constitutional importance: is it possible to force Member States to respect the Union’s “fundamental values”? It will begin by laying out three of the main mechanisms available to the European institutions: the infringement proceedings, the Rule of Law mechanism and article 7 TEU. It will then develop the thesis, laid down by Kelemen, of the Union’s “authoritarian equilibrium”, which will serve to explain the European institutions’ behaviour. After analysing several proposals for the conditionality of the recovery fund, none of which present major legal obstacles, it will conclude that the European institutions’ inaction, faced with democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, is not owed to a lack of legal instruments or of competences, but, first and foremost, to a lack of political will.</p>
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<p>El gran ausente en las negociaciones del fondo europeo de recuperación volvió a ser el estado de derecho. Este artículo planteará una cuestión de gran importancia constitucional: ¿es posible obligar a los estados miembro a respetar los “valores fundamentales” de la UE? Comenzará detallando tres de los mecanismos contenidos en los tratados: el procedimiento de infracción, el “Rule of Law mechanism” y el artículo 7 TUE. A continuación, desarrollará la tesis, promulgada por Kelemen, del “equilibrio autoritario”, que servirá para explicar el comportamiento de las instituciones europeas. Tras analizar diversas propuestas para condicionar el fondo de recuperación, las cuales no presentan dificultades jurídicas, se concluirá que la inacción de las instituciones europeas ante el deterioro democrático en Polonia y Hungría no se debe a una falta de instrumentos legales o de competencias, sino, sobre todo, a una falta de voluntad política.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:11:15Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:87608536-bc82-43cd-abfb-d72b8308119c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | Spanish English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:11:15Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | Universidad de Sevilla |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:87608536-bc82-43cd-abfb-d72b8308119c2023-11-28T10:52:23ZThe Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:87608536-bc82-43cd-abfb-d72b8308119cSpanishEnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversidad de Sevilla2020Íñiguez, G<p>The elephant in the room during the recovery fund negotiations was, once again, the rule of law. This paper will address a question of great constitutional importance: is it possible to force Member States to respect the Union’s “fundamental values”? It will begin by laying out three of the main mechanisms available to the European institutions: the infringement proceedings, the Rule of Law mechanism and article 7 TEU. It will then develop the thesis, laid down by Kelemen, of the Union’s “authoritarian equilibrium”, which will serve to explain the European institutions’ behaviour. After analysing several proposals for the conditionality of the recovery fund, none of which present major legal obstacles, it will conclude that the European institutions’ inaction, faced with democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, is not owed to a lack of legal instruments or of competences, but, first and foremost, to a lack of political will.</p> <br> <p>El gran ausente en las negociaciones del fondo europeo de recuperación volvió a ser el estado de derecho. Este artículo planteará una cuestión de gran importancia constitucional: ¿es posible obligar a los estados miembro a respetar los “valores fundamentales” de la UE? Comenzará detallando tres de los mecanismos contenidos en los tratados: el procedimiento de infracción, el “Rule of Law mechanism” y el artículo 7 TUE. A continuación, desarrollará la tesis, promulgada por Kelemen, del “equilibrio autoritario”, que servirá para explicar el comportamiento de las instituciones europeas. Tras analizar diversas propuestas para condicionar el fondo de recuperación, las cuales no presentan dificultades jurídicas, se concluirá que la inacción de las instituciones europeas ante el deterioro democrático en Polonia y Hungría no se debe a una falta de instrumentos legales o de competencias, sino, sobre todo, a una falta de voluntad política.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Íñiguez, G The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will? |
| title | The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will? |
| title_full | The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will? |
| title_fullStr | The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will? |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will? |
| title_short | The Rule of Law and the recovery fund’s conditionality: institutional deadlock or lack of political will? |
| title_sort | rule of law and the recovery fund s conditionality institutional deadlock or lack of political will |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT iniguezg theruleoflawandtherecoveryfundsconditionalityinstitutionaldeadlockorlackofpoliticalwill AT iniguezg ruleoflawandtherecoveryfundsconditionalityinstitutionaldeadlockorlackofpoliticalwill |