Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem

We consider the problem faced by a central bank which bails out distressed financial institutions that pose systemic risk to the banking sector. In a structural default model with mutual obligations, the central agent seeks to inject a minimum amount of cash in order to limit defaults to a given pro...

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Main Authors: Cuchiero, C, Reisinger, C, Rigger, S
פורמט: Journal article
שפה:English
יצא לאור: Springer 2023
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author Cuchiero, C
Reisinger, C
Rigger, S
author_facet Cuchiero, C
Reisinger, C
Rigger, S
author_sort Cuchiero, C
collection OXFORD
description We consider the problem faced by a central bank which bails out distressed financial institutions that pose systemic risk to the banking sector. In a structural default model with mutual obligations, the central agent seeks to inject a minimum amount of cash in order to limit defaults to a given proportion of entities. We prove that the value of the central agent’s control problem converges as the number of defaultable institutions goes to infinity, and that it satisfies a drift controlled version of the supercooled Stefan problem. We compute optimal strategies in feedback form by solving numerically a regularized version of the corresponding mean field control problem using a policy gradient method. Our simulations show that the central agent’s optimal strategy is to subsidise banks whose equity values lie in a non-trivial time-dependent region.
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spelling oxford-uuid:8857abe9-3ee3-4edc-a0d6-93c732eeac412024-06-18T09:08:30ZOptimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problemJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:8857abe9-3ee3-4edc-a0d6-93c732eeac41EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2023Cuchiero, CReisinger, CRigger, SWe consider the problem faced by a central bank which bails out distressed financial institutions that pose systemic risk to the banking sector. In a structural default model with mutual obligations, the central agent seeks to inject a minimum amount of cash in order to limit defaults to a given proportion of entities. We prove that the value of the central agent’s control problem converges as the number of defaultable institutions goes to infinity, and that it satisfies a drift controlled version of the supercooled Stefan problem. We compute optimal strategies in feedback form by solving numerically a regularized version of the corresponding mean field control problem using a policy gradient method. Our simulations show that the central agent’s optimal strategy is to subsidise banks whose equity values lie in a non-trivial time-dependent region.
spellingShingle Cuchiero, C
Reisinger, C
Rigger, S
Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
title Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
title_full Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
title_fullStr Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
title_full_unstemmed Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
title_short Optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled Stefan problem
title_sort optimal bailout strategies resulting from the drift controlled supercooled stefan problem
work_keys_str_mv AT cuchieroc optimalbailoutstrategiesresultingfromthedriftcontrolledsupercooledstefanproblem
AT reisingerc optimalbailoutstrategiesresultingfromthedriftcontrolledsupercooledstefanproblem
AT riggers optimalbailoutstrategiesresultingfromthedriftcontrolledsupercooledstefanproblem