Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games

For cooperative games with externalities, the problem of optimally partitioning a set of players into disjoint exhaustive coalitions is called <i>coalition structure generation</i>, and is a fundamental computational problem in multi-agent systems. Coalition structure generation is, in g...

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Main Authors: Fatima, S, Wooldridge, M
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Springer 2022
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author Fatima, S
Wooldridge, M
author_facet Fatima, S
Wooldridge, M
author_sort Fatima, S
collection OXFORD
description For cooperative games with externalities, the problem of optimally partitioning a set of players into disjoint exhaustive coalitions is called <i>coalition structure generation</i>, and is a fundamental computational problem in multi-agent systems. Coalition structure generation is, in general, computationally hard and a large body of work has therefore investigated the development of efficient solutions for this problem. However, the existing methods are mostly limited to deterministic environments. In this paper, we focus attention on uncertain environments. Specifically, we define <i>probabilistically monotone partition function games</i>, a subclass of the well-known <i>partition function games</i> in which we introduce uncertainty. We provide a constructive proof that an exact optimum can be found using a greedy approach, present an algorithm for finding an optimum, and analyze its time complexity.
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spelling oxford-uuid:889ea68e-2686-4c20-ab7e-623275eb7eea2023-06-27T13:58:25ZOptimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function gamesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:889ea68e-2686-4c20-ab7e-623275eb7eeaEnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2022Fatima, SWooldridge, MFor cooperative games with externalities, the problem of optimally partitioning a set of players into disjoint exhaustive coalitions is called <i>coalition structure generation</i>, and is a fundamental computational problem in multi-agent systems. Coalition structure generation is, in general, computationally hard and a large body of work has therefore investigated the development of efficient solutions for this problem. However, the existing methods are mostly limited to deterministic environments. In this paper, we focus attention on uncertain environments. Specifically, we define <i>probabilistically monotone partition function games</i>, a subclass of the well-known <i>partition function games</i> in which we introduce uncertainty. We provide a constructive proof that an exact optimum can be found using a greedy approach, present an algorithm for finding an optimum, and analyze its time complexity.
spellingShingle Fatima, S
Wooldridge, M
Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
title Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
title_full Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
title_fullStr Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
title_full_unstemmed Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
title_short Optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
title_sort optimal coalition structures for probabilistically monotone partition function games
work_keys_str_mv AT fatimas optimalcoalitionstructuresforprobabilisticallymonotonepartitionfunctiongames
AT wooldridgem optimalcoalitionstructuresforprobabilisticallymonotonepartitionfunctiongames